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One  way  to  bring  order  into  the  often  muddled  picture  we  have  of  interdisciplinarity  is  to  sort 
interdisciplinary  projects  or  aims  by  the  kinds  of  element  that  interact  in  encounters  between 
researchers  of  the  two  or  more  disciplines  involved.  This  is  not  the  usual  approach.  Since  the  early 
seventies and the publication of Erich Jantsch (1972), at least, the level of integration of the disciplines 
has been the primary focus. For  instance, the level of  integration  is often  treated as  the distinguishing 
boundary between multi‐, inter‐, and trans‐disciplinarity. 
 
We  identify  three  kinds  of  interdisciplinary  relation:  problem‐feeding,  conceptual  drift,  and 
methodological migration; we focus,  in particular, on  the first of these. Drawing on examples from the 
emerging  field  of  Sustainability  Science  we  show  that  problem‐feeding  is  a  common  and  apparently 








Our  notion of  problem‐feeding has  a  predecessor  in  the work  of  Lindley Darden  and Nancy Maull  on 
‘interfield  theories’,  i.e.  theories  relating more  than  one  disciplinary  field. More precisely,  our  notion 
resembles what Darden and Maull  refer  to as  ‘problem shifts’.  A brief  illustration will  suffice  for now. 
Through  a  series  of  scientific  changes,  beginning  around  1910,  the  problem  of  understanding  the 
physical  basis  of  heritable  alterations  shifted  from  genetics  to  biochemistry,  where  it  was  famously 
solved  in  the  1950s  (see  Maull  1977).  As  we  shall  see,  problem  shifts  exemplify  a  special  kind  of 
problem‐feeding that occurs under certain characteristic conditions. 
 





response  to  reductionism,  which  was  then  the  received  view.  Maull’s  (1977)  main  targets  are 
reductionist  analyses  of  the  sort  pursued  by  Ernest  Nagel  (1961)  where  one  theory  deductive‐
nomologically  explains  another.  In  the  Nagelian  perspective  physical  optics  and  Maxwell’s 
electromagnetic theory are intertheoretically related to the extent that Maxwell’s theory can be used to 
derive physical optics; and in general theory T2 is reduced to T1 when all the generalizations  in T2 can 
be  logically  deduced  from  generalizations  in  T1.  Normally  this  requires  auxiliaries  that  correlate 
descriptive expressions (from now on referred to as ‘terms’) in T1 and T2. For instance, the light vector 
of physical optics first had to be identified with the electric force vector of Maxwell’s theory. As a result, 
each  term  has  a  primary  sense,  fixed  by  its  own  theory,  and  a  secondary  sense,  obtained  by  the 
correlation. 
 




Kenneth  Schaffner’s  (1967)  modification  of  Nagel’s  account.  Schaffner  proposes  that  reduction 
sometimes occurs after a  slight modification of  T2. Sciences  in  the process of being  reduced display a 
need for more “careful and corrected redefinition”, and as a result of correction reduction is facilitated. 
However,  Schaffner  (1974)  later warned  against  deploying  this  as  an  explanation of  scientific  change. 
Reduction is often too “peripheral” an aim in actual cases to motivate the redefinition of terms in T2.  
 






another,  that  is  to  say,  before  the  question  of  reduction  can  even  arise,  extensive 
unification between  fields must  already have  taken place.  Connections  between  terms of 




only  a  tangential  relationship  to  our  account  of  problem‐feeding,  her  related  observation  (see  also 
Darden and Maull 1977, 59) about the effects of the correlation of terms is very much to the point: 
 
This  alternative  to  derivational  reduction  begins  by  drawing  attention  to  the  way  a 
vocabulary  can  be  ‘shared’  by  different  areas  of  research.  Such  a  ‘shared’  vocabulary,  it 
turns out, can be used to identify a very special sort of problem, a problem that, although it 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We  have  briefly  mentioned  an  example  of  the  latter  process.  ‘Mutation’  (heritable  alteration  of  the 
genotype)  was  first  a  proper  term  in  genetics;  it  was  then  transformed  into  ‘mutation’  (heritable 
alteration  in  the  base  sequence  of  DNA)  of  the  sort  witnessed  in  biochemistry.  This  correlation  and 
subsequent  transformation  made  it  possible  to  make  progress  on  previously  intractable  issues  in 
genetics, including the question, What  is the physical nature of the alterable determinants of heredity? 
In other words, problems concerning  the physical nature of the determinants of heredity arose within 
genetics.  Genetics  could  not  solve  them. One  reason was methodological. Genetics  deploys  statistical 







of correction and  redefinition. Maull  is obviously not  in  favour of  reduction, and  this  introduces a big 





transformation  –  of  terms.  Transformation  of  terms  is  thus  an  ontological  how‐possibly  explanation 
(Persson 2011) of problem shifts.  But an ontological  how‐possibly  explanation of  X  (i)  is only a partial 
explanation of X and (ii) does not imply uniqueness – other explanations of essentially the same kind of 
phenomenon may exist. The notion that a full explanation of problem shifts requires more is illustrated 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for  the  term  to  be  a  proper  term  in  both  fields  the  field  assignment  needs  to  be  acceptable  to  both 





As was seen  in  the preceding section, problem‐feeding is sometimes a secondary phenomenon,  in the 
sense  that  it  is  a  by‐product  of more  fundamental  processes. Our  suspicion  is  that  the need  to  solve 
problems  by  first  feeding  them  to  another  field  is  sometimes  itself  the  fundamental  reason  why 
correlation of terms takes place and the reason why other kinds of bridge between distinct disciplinary 




scientific  expertise  is  prima  facie  relevant.  It  is  not  uncommon  for  scientific  experts  to  be  consulted 
when, for instance, environmental risk management issues are scrutinized – or when the causes of, and 
responsibility for, a human injury are examined. However, it is far from always the case that attempted 
problem‐feeding  from  law  to  science  is  successful  in  facilitating  the  lawyer’s  decision.  Lena Wahlberg 
(2010) reports the following expert’s experience: 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The  following,  more  constructive,  example  is  perhaps  typical  of  problem‐feeding  in  sustainability 
science, where frequently problems are defined by natural sciences and exported to social science. In an 
influential paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
(PNAS)  Timothy  Lenton  (2008)  and his  colleagues  defined  and  identified  a  number  of  climatic  tipping 
elements (and a few tipping points). Tipping elements are systems which, once pushed across a certain 
threshold,  or  tipping  point,  are  likely  to  exhibit  non‐linear,  disruptive  change.  The  PNAS  text  lists  15 
policy‐relevant  tipping  elements,  including  Arctic  summer  sea‐ice,  the  Greenland  ice  sheet,  Atlantic 
thermohaline circulation, and the Indian summer monsoon. These elements, the authors argue, can be 
pushed by human  interaction across a  tipping point  resulting  in Arctic  sea‐ice  loss,  the melting of  the 
Greenland ice sheet, Atlantic deep water formation, and Indian monsoon chaotic multi‐stability, and so 
on. Furthermore, all of  these elements contribute significantly  to human welfare as we know  it  today.   
Identification  of  these  tipping  points  clearly  falls,  in  many  cases,  within  the  domain  of  some  natural 
science  discipline  or  aggregate  thereof.  On  the  other  hand,  addressing  them  is  first  and  foremost  a 
concern for societies. But the missing piece of the picture  is this: in order to work out all relevant facts 
constraining  a  viable  solution  both  natural  and  social  sciences  will  have  to  contribute  substantively. 
Other problems that Lenton and his colleagues consider are more specific and hinge on the applicability 





feeding.  Early  attempts  to  understand  and model  the  influence  of  CO2 were mostly made by  and  for 
physicists. Scientists wished  to  explain why  the Earth suddenly  got  substantially warmer some 10,000 
years  ago.2  In  the  1820s  Joseph  Fourier  suggested  the  mechanism  that  later  become  known  as  the 
‘greenhouse effect.’  John Tyndall noted  in 1861  that CO2  fitted  the specifications,  together with other 
gases such as common water vapour. Physicist Svante Arrhenius (1896) developed the first quantitative 
model.  By  laborious  computations  he  managed  to  come  up  with  the  prediction  that  a  doubling  of 
atmospheric  CO2  would  result  in  an  increase  in  mean  surface  temperature  of  5‐6°  C.
3  As  Bert  Bolin 
(2007)  notes,  Arrhenius  considered  the  influx  of  fossil  carbon  into  the  atmosphere  caused by  human 
activities a possible source of warming. However,  two assumptions that  turned out to be  incorrect  led 
Arrhenius  to dismiss  this possibility. The first concerned  the increase in fossil  fuel consumption, which 
turned  out  to  be  greater  than  anyone  imagined  in  the  final  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The 
second incorrect assumption concerned the solubility of CO2 in the oceans. Arrhenius overestimated it, 
as would many after him.  By  the 1950s approximations of  the average  time a molecule of CO2 would 
spend  in  the atmosphere before  it was absorbed by  the sea varied  from as  little as 16 hours  to 1,000 
years.4 Hence  it must have been  fairly clear  that  there  in  fact was a problem. Nonetheless,  in  spite of 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water.  The  change  of  this  equilibrium  in  the  sea  is  almost  instantaneous.  However,  in 
course of its circulation the ocean water gets in contact with solid CaCO3 on the bottom of 
the sea whereby a  change  towards another  equilibrium takes place. This  latter process  is 






into  the  atmosphere.  Eventually  the  atmosphere‐ocean  system  settles  in  a  CO2  equilibrium,  but  that 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Problems  encountered by  physicists  were  solved by  chemists  and oceanographers.  Both  the problem 
and its solution had relevance to any student of the larger cycle. At first the pattern may seem like one 
involving  incremental  increases  of  resolution;  a  process  of  fine‐graining.  Importantly,  however,  as we 
gain a better understanding of the various sub‐mechanisms, our understanding of the system as whole 
needs to be revised. The fact that the oceans function like a buffer solution radically changes the role 





Other  cases  seem  to  exhibit  a  similar  dynamic.  One  concerns  the  problem  of  the  ‘lost’  CO2.  As  the 








Project,  housed  within  the  International  Human  Dimensions  Programme  on  Global  Environmental 










At  times  problem‐feeding  is  mutually  beneficial  to  the  fields  involved.  Darden  (1991,  80)  notes  that 
“[t]he  extremely  fruitful  interaction between  cytology  and Mendelism produced new  hypotheses  and 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predictions  for  both  fields”.  For  example,  a  crucial  aspect  of  the  insight  that  genes  were  located  on 
chromosomes was that facts about the latter’s spatial  interrelations could explain statistical deviations 
that had been noted in classical genetics. Hence the solution to the problem of the physical location of 
the  gene  fed  back  into  genetics,  where  it  explained  various  other  facts  that  had  previously  been 
unaccounted for. There are, however, other – in a sense, weaker – varieties of problem‐feeding. There is 
unilateral  problem‐feeding:  problem‐feeding,  as  it  were,  without  solution‐feeding.  Todd  Grantham 
(2004,  143)  seems  to  have  something  like  this  variety  in  mind  when  he  talks  about  heuristic 




are  easy  enough  to  find;  one,  close  to  home,  is,  of  course,  philosophy  of  science.  Occasionally 





For problem‐feeding  to be mutually beneficial, both of  the disciplines or  fields  involved need  to  enter 
into  well‐defined  –  though  not  necessarily  very  stable  –  relations:  both  need  to  be  made 
complementary, and this complementarity needs to be made explicit. This ordering of fields settles the 
terms,  at  least  preliminarily,  of  the  cognitive  division  of  labour.  Its  mutual  acceptance  ensures  that 
results in the target field are actually valid in the field of origin. These prerequisites should not be taken 
for granted. It is arguably a mistake to think of fields – disciplinary fields, especially – as particularly well 
ordered with  respect  to  their domains of  enquiry. Considerable overlaps and unclarity about who has 
explanatory privilege are not uncommon. As Sandra Mitchell (2009) has pointed out, it is often not clear 
exactly how different theories concerning the same phenomena relate to each other; different accounts, 
perceived  as  alternatives,  may  turn  out  to  be  complementary.  If  there  is  to  be  an  ordered  research 
process involving many disciplines or fields, we think that at least some of these potential disputes need 
to  be  settled. Darden  and Maull,  in  their  conception of  scientific  fields,  omit  this  from  consideration. 
Their  ‘fields’ are  to a  large  extent understood  in  terms of  their methods,  tools, and central problems. 
This puts the emphasis on certain types of boundary and the transactions that go on between them – at 
the cost of obscuring others. For instance, two fields may already share (as often seems to be the case) a 
theory, or conception, of the way  in which  their respective ontologies relate, and of  the reach of their 
respective  methods.  Such  common  preconceptions  may  dictate  the  terms  of  engagement,  and  the 
perceived validity of the results, and may also settle the question of how to divide the research task as 




                                                
9 Grantham also talks of confirmational dependence, where “methods and/or data in one field may be used to 
confirm hypotheses generated in a neighboring field” (2004, 143). 
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discourse  outer  boundaries  are  perhaps  never,  or  only  rarely,  disputed.  The  problems,  or  types  of 
problem, are a well  established part of  the discipline, and  the methods and problem‐solving schemes 
are  largely  settled. This, however,  is a  luxury  that cannot be afforded when  it  comes  to  relations with 










That  correlation of  terms plays  a  crucial  role  in  reduction  and  the  emergence  of  interfield  theories  is 
reason enough to recognize  it as an interdisciplinary relation of some consequence. However, we want 














The  subsuming of  economics  (and,  as  it were,  ecology)  under  the umbrella  of  thermodynamics  is  not 
unlike  classical  projects  of  scientific  integration  and  involves  conceptual  drift  as  a  central  constituent. 
One recent example can be found in Alf Hornborg (2011), who utilizes the thermodynamic framework in 
his discussion of unequal exchange. Here conceptual drift would be a feature of any quantity  imported 
from  a  disciplinary  field  other  than  the  one  in  which  the  problem  of  equal/unequal  exchange  was 
originally discussed.  The occurrence of a  thermodynamic  term,  like  entropy,  in a discussion of human 
ecology only highlights the fact that considerable drift has taken place. 
 
One effect  this particular drift has  is to amplify the primacy of a physics constraint  (Ladyman and Ross 
2007),  i.e.  the  notion  that  other  sciences  have  to  adjust  to  physics  in  cases  of  inconsistency  between 
them  and  physics.  Physics,  because  it  aims  to  develop  accounts  that  are  true  everywhere,  imposes 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absolute  limits  on  other  sciences.  The  conceptual  drift  makes  such  conflicts  and  adjustments  more 
probable  –  as,  of  course,  did  the  development  of  ecological  economics  in  relation  to  the  competing 
‘distinct systems’ view of economics. 
 
As  we  have  already  demonstrated,  conceptual  drift  improves  opportunities  for  problem‐feeding. 










Our  second  example  is  less  clear‐cut.  It  displays  several  features  of  conceptual  drift.  Nevertheless 
something essential seems to be missing. Resilience theory was developed within theoretical ecology by 
C. S. Holling (1972) to describe a certain property of ecosystem dynamics. Inspired by Richard Lewontin’s 
(1969)  notion  of  domains  of  attraction,  Holling  argued  that  certain  management  strategies  –  in 
particular,  a  strategy  of  maximum  sustainable  yield  –  might  involve  considerably  more  risk  than  had 
previously been recognized. The reason is that the resilience of a system, i.e. the margin the system has 
before  (by  force  of  its  own  dynamics)  it  departs  from  its  current  domain  of  attraction,  might  be 
diminished by such a strategy. Resilience differs from stability. Holling describes stability as “the ability 
of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance. The more rapidly it returns, 
and  with  the  least  fluctuation,  the  more  stable  it  is”  (Holling  1972,  17).  On  the  ‘stability  view’ 
ecosystems typically have a single equilibrium to which the system will return given any initial condition 
(save  for  one  where  one  variable  is  set  to  nil  to  begin  with).  In  contrast  ’resilience  views’  usually 
recognize several local equilibria. The consequence of this for a specified manager of the system (like a 
community  fishing  a  lake  for  food)  is  that  naturally  occurring,  but  random,  events  such  as  occasional 
draughts,  hurricanes,  or  diseases  which,  under  normal  circumstances,  the  system  would  absorb 
suddenly  become  more  likely  to  push  the  system  over  the  brink.  Should  that  happen,  the  internal 
dynamics  of  the  system  drive  its  state  parameters  to  zero.10  Holling  derives  from  this  argument 
prescriptive  consequences  for  a manager  of  systems  that  satisfy  dynamics  of  this  particular  kind –  as 
ecosystems do, for example.11 









Draft paper prepared for SPSP Exeter 2011. © Thorén, H. & Persson, J. (2011). 
11 
The  drift  of  the  concept  of  resilience has  happened  in  the  course  of  its  application  in  other  types  of 
system,  particularly  what  have  come  to  be  called  ‘coupled  social‐ecological  systems’  (SESs).  This 
application occurs  in two ways. First, there is derivative resilience. Here an SES is said to be resilient in 
virtue of its ecosystem component; hence some aspect of the social component – say, a particular policy 
or  institution – can be  resilient on condition that  it makes or promotes resilience  in an ecosystem that 
the  society  relies  upon.  But  there  is  also  a  non‐derivative  use  of  resilience  in  which  both  social  and 






imperialism,  Uskali  Mäki  and  Catherina  Marchionni  (forthcoming;  see  also  Mäki  2009)  suggest  a 
distinction  between  domain‐only  and  disciplinary  imperialism.  In  the  former  one  discipline  claims 
explanatory  relevance  in  a  domain  traditionally  associated  with  another  discipline.  This  is  only  to  be 
expected, since disciplines are  in general not well confined within their domains. Sometimes this takes 
place  with  no  influence  on  the  disciplines  that  were  previously  the  only  ones  to  claim  the  domain 
infringed  upon.  No  actual  interdisciplinarity  needs  to  emerge.  Disciplinary  imperialism,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  more  explicit  and  invasive.  Either  the  imperializing  discipline  ‘takes  over’  the  domain  in 
question;  or  the  methods  (models,  theories,  and/or  concepts)  of  the  domain  are  adopted  by  the 




important  differences  between  the  two  cases  presented  in  this  section.  Resilience  theory  is  often 
presented by  its  proponents  as  a  sustainability  framework  that may unify  social  and natural  sciences. 
However, neither their terminology nor their theoretical framework seems to have caught on with the 
relevant  social  sciences.  Social  scientists,  who  have  traditionally  been  concerned  with  the  domain  of 
enquiry at  issue here, have been unaffected by  this conceptual drift.  In fact, resilience  theory, despite 
having some influence on policy making, seems to be of interest mainly to ecologists with sustainability 
leanings.  Resilience  thinking  involves  a  form of  conceptual  drift  that  can be  characterized  as domain‐
only.  It differs from the thermodynamics case, which  is disciplinary (and hence interdisciplinary)  in our 
second sense. 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One  could,  perhaps,  object  at  this  point  that  domain‐only  conceptual  drift  is  irrelevant  for 
interdisciplinarity.  However,  there  are  two  reasons  why  a  philosopher  interested  in  interdisciplinarity 
would  want  to  acknowledge  domain‐only  conceptual  drift.  First,  domain‐only  drift  often  promises 
disciplinary  drift.  The  former  is  not  sufficient,  but  it  may  nevertheless  produce  a  how‐possibly 
mechanism,  eventually  generating  interdisciplinary  relations.  Resilience  theoreticians  provide 
conceptual structures that might be endorsed by social sciences; they see these structures as a way of 
unifying  dislodged  and  disconnected  domains.  We  agree  up  to  a  point:  resilience  theory  provides 
mechanisms  that  might  do  the  job.  Second,  other  factors,  like  asymmetry  of  standing,  or  just  plain 
suspicion, can certainly affect uptake of concepts  in  the target discipline. True,  these other factors are 
crucial,  but  unless  someone  has  reason  to  think  the  actual  conceptual  structures  in  question  in  fact 
apply to another domain that set of problems would not even arise. 
 
Not  all  types  of  conceptual  drift  amount  to  something  as  substantive  as  correlations  of  terms, 
transformations, or full scale reduction; borrowings may be metaphorical. Stephen Kellert (2008) notes 




Hence  partial  correlation,  at  least,  is  already  in  play,  as  certain  components  of  the  metaphor  are 








countless ways  (most  of  them  in  Holling’s  work).  Thermodynamic  concepts,  on  the other  hand,  seem 
much  more  stable  –  probably,  for  the  plain  reason  that  the  original  context  of  thermodynamics  is 
independent of what happens when thermodynamic concepts drift into ecological economics and other 
contexts.  Darden  and  Maull’s  mutation  example  is  rather  distinctive  in  this  respect.  Changes  and 
additions appear  to have been made  to  the notion of mutation, but  it was stable  enough not  to split. 
The long‐term reason for that  is arguably that the knowledge claims associated with ‘mutation’ turned 
out  to be  correct.  In  the short  term, however,  something  else needs  to be  in place  to guarantee such 

















by borrowing some of  the methods deployed  in  the other  field  to solve problems of  the sort one has 
previously exported. This may also be possible in cases where conceptual bridges are not relevant. 
 
Prima  facie methodological migration  can  occur  in  several  ways.  For  instance,  we  could make  use  of 
Mäki  and  Marchionni’s  distinction  again.  Methods  can  be  migrated  domain‐only  where  a  method 
already  known within one discipline  is deployed  to extract  information  from a domain  to which  it has 
not  previously  been  applied.  An  example  of  this  can  perhaps  be  drawn  from  the  same  pool  as  our 
resilience  example;  from within  the  ranks  of  ecology  there  has  been  a  degree of  optimism about  the 
power of  the methods used  there. As  before,  this does not have  to  result  in actual  interdisciplinarity, 
since  the  other  field  operating  in  the  domain  need  not  be  influenced.    Disciplinary methodological 
migration,  on  the  other  hand,  involves  the  taking  up,  within  a  discipline,  of  some methodology  from 
elsewhere. 
 
For  the sake of clarity  it  is perhaps also useful  to  separate disciplinary methodological migration  from 
what  has  been  called  methodological  integration;  and  to  point  out  that  only  the  former  is  a  case  of 




not  migration.  (What  migrates  here  are  data.  Data  migration  could  usefully  be  added  to  our  non‐
exhaustive list of problem‐feeding, conceptual drift, and methodological migration.) 
 
Disciplinary methodological migration can  result  in  the migrating method out‐competing  the methods 
that were previously  in  play. Two observations by Ronald Coase  (1978, 204)  (see also Mäki  2009) are 
interesting in this context: 
 
[I]n  the  long  run  it  is  the subject matter,  the  kind of  question which  the practitioners are 
trying to answer, which tends to be the dominant factor producing the cohesive force that 
makes a group of scholars a recognizable profession… However, in the short run, the ability 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Methodological  migration,  to  reframe  Coase’s  view,  is  a  powerful  but  temporary  interdisciplinary 
relation.  This  can  be  contrasted  with  the  position  of  Margaret  Morrison  (2000),  who  claims  that 
unification usually results from the use of similar mathematical techniques. 
 




problems. At  least  one non‐sequential  variety  is  similar:  certain  phenomena have multiple  causes  the 
investigation of which  is  carried out using different methods. A  third  kind of methodological pluralism 
that might result from methodological migration is  illustrated by the use of multiple methods to obtain 






sufficient  for  interdisciplinarity,  even  if  the method has migrated  from the one  field  to  the other. For 
instance,  statistical  analysis  is widespread  in  both natural  and  social  sciences.  However,  this  does  not 
seem  to  warrant  talk  of  interdisciplinarity.  Why  is  this?  Is  it  because  the  migrating  method  is  not 
sufficiently anchored in the field it from which it drifts? This would be alarming news to those involved 
in the many unificationist programmes. Philosophers trying to facilitate the unification of A and B would 





Howsoever  that may be,  in our opinion  the most  interesting  interdisciplinary cases  of methodological 











Two points need making  here. To begin with,  this  last analogy  claim  is a  substantial ontological  claim 
ordering two domains in a manner similar to the one we have discussed above. Secondly, and perhaps a 
little  more  subtly,  it  does  not  follow,  simply  from  this  analogy,  that  the  methodology  will  yield  any 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interesting information. Hence there are two ways this potential methodology migration can go wrong. 
The analogy may not hold. Alternatively  (or additionally)  the new phenomena, while belonging  to  the 
general class of things appropriately investigated by the method, may also belong to other classes that 
for  some  reason  are  thought  more  important.  Societies  might  well  be  complex  systems.  However, 
whereas that is an interesting feature of ecosystems, it is perhaps not an interesting feature of societies. 
Discussion 
Interdisciplinarity  is  often  construed  in  terms  of  integration  of  some  sort,  and  the much‐used  multi‐, 
inter‐,  transdisciplinarity  trichotomy  is  usually  set  up  accordingly. We  owe  this  trichotomy  to  Jantsch 
(1972).  It  has  been  fleshed  out  in  various  ways,  but  standardly  multidisciplinarity  is  the  mere 
juxtaposition  of  knowledge;  transdisciplinarity  involves  the  sharing  of  some  set  of  axioms  (hence 
approaching disciplinarity  it would seem); and interdisciplianrity  is conceived of as  the middle ground, 
being  ‘both  integrative’ and  ‘boundary maintaining’.  The  term  ‘integration’  is, however, ambiguous.  It 
can be  interpreted in different ways, depending on what  it  is that  is supposed to be being  integrated. 
Most often,  looking at matters from the point of view of philosophy anyway, we see  integration being 
thought  of  in  terms of  theories.  As we  have pointed out,  even when  integration  is methodological  it 
seems to be executed against some theoretical assumption or other. Theoretical integration can mean a 
lot  of  different  things.  Reduction  is  often  construed  as  a  kind of  theoretical  integration,  but  so  is  the 
formulation  of  interfield  theories.  The  motivations  may  differ  accordingly.  Epistemic  values,  such  as 
theoretic  parsimony,  may  warrant  eliminative  reduction;  criteria  of  a  more  ontological,  or  even 
metaphysical, character may alternatively be employed; our  theoretical predicament may  tell us more 
about  how  the world  is  after  integration  than  it  did  before,  parsimony notwithstanding. An  emphasis 
upon  such  ontologically  motivated  integration  makes  the  integrative  process  appear  cumulative.  In 
particular,  it comes  to seem that  the integrative process will  leave  the involved parts more integrated 
after it is completed than they were before it began. Given this measure of interdisciplinary success, it is 




Certain  cases  of  problem‐feeding may  serve  as  an  exception  to  this  story  about  success measured  in 
terms  of  integration.  Problem‐feeding  involves  obvious  epistemic  goods;  one  manages  to  solve 
problems  that would otherwise be  impossible, or at  least  very difficult,  to  solve.  The  end  result  is not 
that the disciplines involved become more integrated. In the case of the linking of, on the one hand, the 
buffering  mechanism  in  the  oceans  and  observational  results  of  its  slow  overturn,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  physical  models  of  the  atmosphere,  it  seems  that  the  important  links  between  chemistry, 
oceanography, and physics, were in place already. They did not become more closely tied to each other 
in  this  process  –  not  in  any  significant  sense,  anyway.  Nonetheless,  an  important  problem  found  its 
solution. 
 
Another  interesting  aspect  of  problem‐feeding  concerns  a  point  quite  different  from  those  discussed 
until now. In modern discussion of  interdisciplinarity – which has been ongoing since Sharif and Sharif 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(1969) at least – a recurring theme has been a concern that there will be a trade‐off between the depth 
and breadth of  knowledge.  The ultimate  responsibility  of  interdisciplinary work  seems  to  land on  the 
already burdened shoulders of individual researchers. The worry has been that it is not feasible to train 
individuals  systematically.  The  individuals  involved  will  simply  not  be  able  to  digest  the  amount  of 
information required, and they will therefore be obliged to prioritize breadth over depth. Indeed there 
are  many  cases  where  theoretical  constructs  have  been  deployed  out  of  context  with  questionable 
results (see Kellert 2008).  
 
In  problem‐feeding  interdisciplinarity,  however,  it  seems  that  it  would  be  enough  for  individual 
researchers  to  know  who  they  should  to  consult,  i.e.  in  effect,  what  discipline  is  likely  to  provide  a 
solution. Admittedly,  this  is  not  always  very  clear  –  as  Larry  Laudan  (1977)  has  noted;  and  there will 
certainly be cases where substantial work needs to be done before problems can be assigned correctly. 






pass. For  instance,  it was  impossible  to work out the physical  location of the gene within transmission 
genetics because the methods and tools available there would not allow it. But why did not transmission 
geneticists simply acquire  the tools  they needed? Fields and disciplines routinely do  this kind of thing. 










We have distinguished  three  kinds of  interdisciplinary  relation. Methodological migration  involves  the 
transfer of methods across disciplinary boundaries. Conceptual drift  concerns  the  connecting of  terms 
between disciplines. Our main  focus has been on problem‐feeding.  The  transfer of problems between 
disciplines  is  interesting  for  several  reasons, but as yet  it has not been studied  in  sufficient detail and 
depth. This study is preliminary; hence its conclusions remain rather limited.  









this  paper we have drawn our  examples  from  the  fields  of  climate  science  and  ecological  economics, 
both of which are  integral  to  the  formation of  the emerging  field of Sustainability Science. One of  the 
central  problems  in  Sustainability  Science  centres  on  the  connections  running  from  certain  natural 
phenomena,  like  climate  change,  to  certain  social  and human phenomena,  like  democracy,  economic 
growth,  development,  equity,  and  so  on. A  paradox  seems  to  loom over  explicit  endorsement  of  the 
pluralism  in  the  field  together with  the anticipated calls  for  integration and unification of natural and 
social sciences – calls often responded to by a search for a common and substantive shared theoretical 
framework. Resilience theory  is one such framework. We think, however, that the focus could be more 
local and bottom‐up.  Instead of  trying  to find an overarching point of reference, one could  ‘follow the 
problems.’  Perhaps certain assumptions would still have  to be shared, as we have  indicated, but  they 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